One of the researchers involved, Michael Schwarz, has uploaded a YouTube video demonstrating the technique:Īpple now Arm'd to the teeth: MacBook Air and Pro, Mac mini to be powered by custom M1 chips rather than Intel READ MORE With privileged access, the Platypus team claim they can recover RSA private keys from an Mbed TLS implementation within 100 minutes by inferring the instructions executed inside an SGX enclave, and can derandomize kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR) in 20 seconds by observing power consumption variance between valid and invalid kernel addresses. They are designed to hold things like DRM decryption code for media, cryptographic secrets, and so on, that not even the owner and operator of the hardware – which could be a cloud giant or a PC user – can access.
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The contents of SGX enclaves are supposed to be hidden from even a system's administrators, users, operating system, and other software running on the box.
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Also, this latest attack did not require physical access to the computer because it relied on the software-based RAPL interface. This time, the boffins have done a bit better, obtaining AES-NI keys from an SGX enclave and the Linux kernel in somewhere between 26 hours (ideal conditions) to 277 hours (real-world conditions).